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AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON MEDICINES 
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS:  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH  
David G Legge, Deborah H Gleeson, Hans 
Löfgren1 and Belinda Townsend 
Universal access to affordable medicines, which are safe, efficacious and 
of high quality, and which are appropriately used, depends on national 
legislation that is in turn constrained by a range of international 
agreements. This regulatory configuration also affects the profitability of 
the pharmaceutical industry, domestic and international. Tensions and 
contradictions between industry profitability and public health objectives 
relate to access, innovation and regulation.  
High levels of intellectual property (IP) protection (including easy 
patenting, generous privileges and strong enforcement) enable longer 
monopoly pricing which contributes to pharmaceutical industry revenues 
but increases the cost barriers to consumers and the cost burden on 
national health systems. The access barriers associated with monopoly 
pricing are particularly steep for poor people with little or no social 
protection and are particularly burdensome for developing countries 
(Abbott and Dukes 2009).  
High levels of IP protection are said to be necessary to fund corporate 
research and development (PhRMA 2013). However, funding research 
and development (R&D) through monopoly pricing also means that 
investment is selectively directed to the development of drugs which 
promise high commercial returns. A WHO Commission concluded in 
                                                 
1 Dr Hans Lofgren passed away unexpectedly while this paper was in press. Over the last 
decade, Hans' work was dedicated to advancing access to medicines in India and the 
developing world. He will be sorely missed: for his role in the global struggle for access to 
medicines, and as a teacher, research supervisor, mentor and friend. 
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2006 that the development of drugs for conditions which 
disproportionately affect people living in developing countries has been 
neglected because of poor expected returns (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights Innovation and Public Health 2006). High profit margins 
also support aggressive marketing which contributes to the over-use and 
misuse of medicines and further financial burdens on families and 
governments. 
Since the advent of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in 1995 there has been a gradual but 
significant strengthening of IP protection, including for medicines, 
through successive bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements 
(Lopert and Gleeson 2013; Roffe et al. 2007; Drahos 2002).  
The TRIPS Agreement committed signatories to providing 20-year patent 
terms in all technology areas and for patents to be available for both 
products and processes (WTO 2010). Many developing countries resisted 
the new IP standards embedded in TRIPS but, as Drahos tells it (2002), 
they were ultimately coerced into agreeing. The principles enshrined in 
the agreement are implemented domestic legislation, which provides 
governments with some flexibility, as confirmed by the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WTO 
Ministerial Council 2001; Scherer and Watal 2001). The term ‘TRIPS 
flexibilities’ refers to the discretion available to WTO members in 
amending domestic patent laws to conform to TRIPS. In particular, it is 
legal under TRIPS to legislate for the issuing of compulsory licenses and 
for ‘parallel importation’ (sourcing drugs available on the open market in 
other countries where these are available at lower prices than are charged 
by the domestic distributors). These are important flexibilities but they 
need to be articulated in domestic law for implementation.  
There has been powerful opposition to developing countries seeking to 
utilise the flexibilities available under TRIPS, most famously when a 
consortium of 39 international pharmaceutical companies sued the 
government of South Africa over its use of parallel importing (Heywood 
2009). This was at a time when HIV medications and other branded 
medicines were priced far out of the reach of patients in developing 
countries. The drug companies were supported by the Clinton 
administration, which also placed South Africa on its 301 Watch List as a 
precursor to trade sanctions. An international coalition of non-
government groups mobilised in solidarity with South Africa. The 
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pharmaceutical companies were effectively shamed through bad 
publicity and the legal case was withdrawn (Gray and Vawda 2013). Yet 
their objectives remain unchanged and as recently as January 2014 it 
emerged that the international pharmaceutical industry was gearing up to 
launch a campaign against a new South African law establishing a 
domestic system for patent claim examination (Saez 2014).  
The global pharmaceutical corporations, led by Pfizer, were early 
advocates of the TRIPS Agreement but since 1994 have pushed for even 
stronger IP protection. Starting with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, there has been a proliferation of bilateral 
and plurilateral trade agreements enshrining progressively stronger IP 
protection, commonly referred to as ‘TRIPS Plus’ provisions (Roffe et al. 
2007).  
The global IP system has evolved incrementally, with variations in 
conformity and resistance across the developing world and in different 
institutional contexts (Deere 2008; Williams and Lofgren 2013). 
Countries such as Brazil (Chaves et al. 2008), Thailand (Soontarajarn 
2006) and India (India 2011) have sought to resist high levels of IP 
protection for public health reasons and to protect domestic generics 
manufacturers. They have been supported by civil society networks such 
as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Third World Network (TWN) and 
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) (Shashikant 2007). In their 
perspective, the harms resulting from excessive IP protection include: 
first, that monopoly pricing creates unacceptable price barriers to access; 
second, that funding R&D on the basis of anticipated profit distorts 
investment in new medicines; and third, that much of the revenue 
garnered through monopoly pricing is misused in marketing. Their policy 
positions are generally directed to delinking R&D from monopoly 
pricing (CEWG 2012). This would lead to lower prices, more rational 
R&D spending, and stem the flow of revenues into perverse and 
aggressive marketing (Moon et al. 2012; Soos and Lofgren 2013).  
Three important areas of debate where these tensions between strong IP 
protection and public health objectives (access, quality and safety, 
rational use and innovation) can be clearly delineated: first, the pressures 
on countries to adopt levels of IP protection in excess of those required 
by the TRIPS Agreement; second, the policing of alleged infringements 
of IP rights (in particular the criminalisation of IP infringements 
including mandated in-transit seizures, and the industry demand that 
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medicines regulatory agencies assist in the policing of IP rights); and 
third, the regulation of over use and misuse of medicines in health care 
and in agriculture. 
The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the role played by 
the Australian government in three forums where international norms and 
agreements affecting the pricing, innovation and regulation of medicines 
have been or are being negotiated: the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and current 
negotiations regarding IP provisions in the proposed Trans Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA).  
The article is based on an analysis of Australian government policy 
statements, resolutions and summary records of the World Health 
Organisation, the text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade agreement, leaked 
draft chapters of the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and 
secondary sources and commentary in the refereed literature and civil 
society discussion.  
In each of the three cases the context of negotiations is reviewed 
(including levels of transparency), the arguments at issue are explored 
and the position taken by the Australian government is analysed. 
Analysing the policies adopted in these forums has involved, first, 
evaluating the stated (or imputed) logic of the policies, having regard to 
broadly shared policy objectives and the different ideological world 
views in which such policy objectives are to be interpreted. Second, the 
political pressures and influences shaping the positions adopted have 
been reviewed, including the demands of the corporate world, the 
requirements of geopolitics and the concerns of different domestic 
constituencies that may have an interest in these debates.  
IP and Medicines at the World Health Organisation 
Within the WHO, tensions between IP protection and medicines policy 
have been prominent in three debates: WHO’s role in evaluating the 
health implications of trade agreements (and in particular the full 
utilisation of TRIPS flexibilities); the funding of R&D for diseases 
predominantly affecting developing countries; and the conflation of 
medicines regulation with the policing of IP. In the context of these 
debates, Australia has sought to weaken the capacity of WHO to advise 
member states regarding the health implications of trade agreements, has 
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opposed WHO work towards delinking patents from medicines research 
through a global R&D treaty, and has sought to conflate quality of 
medicines issues with IP privileges and mandate the policing of 
pharmaceutical IP by medicines regulatory agencies. The analysis below 
is informed by materials assembled by WHO Watch (WHO Watch 
2013a), a project of the global People’s Health Movement (WHO Watch 
2013b). 
Lack of support in the WHO for full utilisation of TRIPS flexibilities  
Shortly after the TRIPS agreement came into force in 1995, amidst rising 
tensions over patents and access to medicines, member states of the 
WHO, through resolution A52.19, requested that the Director General 
assist members in developing policies and regulations that assess the 
pharmaceutical and health policy implications of trade agreements and 
assist countries to ‘maximize the positive and mitigate the negative 
impact of those agreements’ (World Health Assembly 1999).  
In May 2005, the WHO Secretariat submitted a report on trade and health 
to the WHO Executive Board (EB) (EB116/4, WHO 2005b). While it 
was praised by several developing countries, the United States delegation 
criticised the report, and accused the Secretariat of being ‘against 
industry, free trade, and intellectual property’ (WHO 2005a:41ff.). 
Thailand introduced a resolution ‘International trade and health’, on 
behalf of itself and thirteen countries, which urged member states to 
work towards policy coherence in trade and health, and to reduce the 
risks to health systems and health outcomes from trade agreements. The 
draft requested the Director-General to provide support to member states 
in relation to these goals. Australia was at this time a member of the EB 
(the US was not). Australia’s representative (Ms Jane Halton) proposed a 
complex set of amendments (WHO 2005a:64-7) which sought to weaken 
the urgency of the resolution, rendering the analysis more bland and the 
recommendations more diffident, see also Khor (2005). The debate was 
deferred to the next EB meeting in January 2006 where a revised 
resolution was agreed for transmitting to the World Health Assembly 
(WHA). 
At the subsequent WHA (May 2006) where the revised resolution was 
adopted, the US cautioned the Secretariat ‘on its technical competency to 
advise member states accurately on the potential implications of trade 
108    JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 73 
rules from a public health perspective’ (WHO 2006:134-40ff.). In the 
weeks before the Assembly, the US had complained to the Director-
General over advice which a senior WHO official (Dr William Aldis) had 
published, recommending that Thailand should be cautious about the 
implications for access to medicines of a mooted US-Thai free trade 
agreement (Williams 2006). Australia did not publicly speak out against 
developing countries using to the full the flexibilities of TRIPS and did 
not explicitly oppose the resolution on trade and health. But Australian 
representatives did seek to water down the text of the original Thai 
resolution. The strength of feeling exhibited by the US in denouncing the 
competence of the WHO Secretariat to advise on trade and health would 
have been clearly communicated to the Australian representatives. For a 
more detailed account of the trade and health resolution see Legge 
(2013). 
Australia has also been among the cheerleaders for the continued freeze 
on mandatory member state contributions to WHO’s budget which has 
undoubtedly limited the capacity of the WHO to undertake work in trade 
and health policy coherence. WHO is funded through mandatory formula 
based contributions (‘assessed contributions’ or ACs) and voluntary 
contributions (VCs which are either tied or untied).  Since the late 1970s 
the proportion of the WHO budget which is met through ACs has fallen 
from 80 per cent to 25 per cent, owing partly to the freeze on ACs and 
partly to increasing voluntary contributions (Legge 2012). Australia, like 
many donor countries provides the bulk of its voluntary contribution as 
earmarked donations to particular programs. In 2010–11 Australia 
provided $68.6 million to WHO, comprising $18.0 million in voluntary 
untied funding, $9.1 in assessed (or mandatory) contributions (untied), 
and a majority of the funding, $41.5 million, in earmarked funding 
(Australian Government 2012b).  
The freeze on ACs means that WHO’s agenda is largely determined by 
the donors (rich countries, philanthropies, international financial 
institutions etc) on the basis of what they are willing to fund, rather than 
the member states through the World Health Assembly (WHA). Not only 
has this arrested action on resolutions of the Assembly on trade 
agreements and the use of TRIPS flexibilities but it has also led to gross 
under funding of medicines regulation and rational use of medicines.  
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IP, innovation and public health: Australia’s role in delay and 
diversion tactics within WHO 
A second debate within the WHO has been on the lack of R&D 
investments by global pharmaceutical companies to develop medicines 
for diseases specially needed for developing countries. Since 2003, a 
series of debates and intergovernmental and expert working groups have 
been commissioned by the WHO to investigate how to improve the 
financing and coordination of R&D for the purpose of developing much 
needed medicines at affordable prices. This culminated in the 2012 report 
to the WHA of the Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and 
Development: Financing and Coordination (A65/24, see WHO 2012a). 
This report explicitly and unambiguously recommended a binding treaty 
for the purposes of funding R&D for conditions disproportionately 
affecting developing countries.   
The concept of a binding R&D treaty as proposed by the CEWG (WHO 
2012a:Chapter 6) entails delinking the patent mechanism from the 
funding of R&D for diseases predominately affecting developing 
countries. R&D would be funded publicly on a contract or prize basis. 
This would remove the argument for monopoly pricing to recoup R&D 
costs. Under such circumstances, there would be no barrier to a 
competitive market in the generic production of such medicines. This 
would mean lower prices. The proposed treaty was supported by many 
developing countries but opposed by pharmaceutical corporations and 
their host governments. The opposition, led by the US and Europe and 
supported by Australia, has taken the form of the repeated re-examination 
of old proposals that have been discarded by CEWG experts, the 
continued assertion that other mechanisms to boost investment in drugs 
could be explored, and procedural delaying tactics.  
The World Health Assembly (May 2012) was divided with resolutions 
for and against the proposed binding R&D treaty. Led by Brazil, India 
and Thailand, the case for delinking pharmaceutical R&D from IP 
protection and monopoly pricing was largely supported by Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. Australia (with the US, Canada and Japan) 
argued for more time, more options and further consultation (WHO 
2012c:51ff.). A deal, brokered by Thailand, transferred the debate to an 
Open Ended Meeting of Member States (OEMS Meeting in November 
2012) which at the final hour (and with few member states in the room), 
resolved to proceed with an R&D observatory and some selected 
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demonstration projects before reconsidering the binding treaty (WHO 
2012b). The binding treaty has been shelved for the time being. 
Undoubtedly it will return.  
The case for delinking and a binding agreement to meet the needs of 
developing countries is strong (Velásquez 2012). However, this would 
establish a precedent that could be extended to other medicines and the 
pharmaceutical corporations and their host countries are strongly 
opposed. The Australian government is part of this opposition, 
participating in delay and diversion tactics.  
IMPACT and the role of medicines regulatory agencies in policing IP 
rights 
A final debate in the WHO in which Australia has taken a position 
contrary to public health considerations concerns the role of medicines 
regulatory agencies in policing IP. Australia, along with Europe and the 
US, has repeatedly conflated, through the slippery use of the term 
‘counterfeiting’, the regulation of quality of medicines with the 
regulation of IP infringement. In trade law ‘counterfeiting’ refers to trade 
mark infringements (WTO nd) but the WHO definition, adopted in the 
early 1990s, encompassed failings with respect to quality, safety and 
efficacy but was ambiguous with respect to intellectual property status. 
Thus, campaigning around ‘counterfeiting’ was able to harness 
government and public concern regarding substandard medications in the 
pursuit of industry objectives of stronger IP protection. 
In 2006, Australia joined the European Commission, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands in funding the International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT). IMPACT was hosted by WHO, and 
WHO was a lead member of the taskforce, although this was never 
mandated by a resolution of the World Health Assembly; indeed it had 
been established without any reference to the governing bodies. IMPACT 
was funded (nearly US$2.6 million) by contributions from the European 
Commission, Australia, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands (altogether 
68%) and by WHO (28%). It also benefitted from significant in-kind 
support from the pharmaceutical industry. Two years after its 
establishment the World Health Assembly (in May 2008) was invited to 
endorse it.  
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IMPACT’s program included publicising vigorously the dangers of 
‘counterfeit’ medicines and advising countries, particularly in Africa, on 
the principles to be enshrined in national legislation against ‘counterfeit’ 
medical products (IMPACT 2007). The principles which it recommended 
be enacted in legislation included references to ensuring that 
pharmaceuticals are appropriately licensed and authorised as well as 
mandating the seizure of ‘counterfeit’ medicines in transit. The 
references to licensing and other provisions in the principles document 
can interpreted as recommending ‘patent linkage’ whereby marketing 
approval becomes dependent upon the applicant demonstrating that the 
product is not under patent (see Shashikant 2010 for a detailed discussion 
of the conflation of IPRs and quality, safety and efficacy in the IMPACT 
principles). Harnessing medicines regulatory authorities in the policing 
of what had previously been a civil wrong (IP infringement) would be a 
significant coup for the international pharmaceutical corporations.  
The establishment of IMPACT needs to be seen in conjunction with a 
number of parallel events including the negotiation of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA, see below), the seizures of 
generic medicines in transit through European ports and the patent law 
reform initiatives in Kenya and Uganda and the East African Community. 
Between October 2008 and May 2009 there were at least six seizures of 
Indian generic drugs in transit through European ports destined for 
Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Nigeria and Vanuatu (Khor 2009). These were 
drugs that were legitimate in both source and destination country and 
were not destined for import into the country of transit. The EU claimed 
that the seizures were required under a 2003 regulation and agreed to 
amend the regulations only after India took the EU to the WTO 
(Anonymous 2010). Around the same time (2008) the Kenyan Patent Act 
was adopted making the manufacturing, import or sale of ‘counterfeit 
goods’ a criminal matter rather than a matter for civil proceedings. In 
April 2012 the Kenya High Court ruled that the Act was too broad and 
vague with respect to counterfeit and generic medicines (IP-Watch 2012). 
When IMPACT was finally introduced to the World Health Assembly 
(two years after it had been established) reservations were expressed by 
many developing countries about the presence of the pharmaceutical 
industry in its management group and associated conflicts of interest and 
the lack of a formal mandate. Levels of suspicion were heightened by the 
concurrent seizures of Indian generics by European customs.  
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WHO’s involvement in IMPACT and the wider questions regarding 
medicines regulation were vigorously contested in the World Health 
Assembly and the Executive Board from this time on. In the course of 
these debates it became clear that the ambiguity regarding the meaning of 
‘counterfeit’ was creating confusion, perhaps intentionally so. WHO had 
adopted its definition of ‘counterfeit’ in 1992 in the context of a 
workshop involving the pharmaceutical industry (Shashikant 2010) at a 
time when the industry, led by Pfizer, was lobbying intensively around 
the drafting of what was to become the TRIPS Agreement (Paine and 
Santoro 1992; Drahos 2002).  
Subsequently the distinction between IP infringements and issues of 
quality, safety and efficacy has become clearer and mechanisms for 
dealing more effectively with the latter are being developed. But rather 
than drop the use of ‘counterfeit’ in relation to substandard medicines 
WHO has adopted the portmanteau term ‘substandard/spurious/falsely-
labelled/falsified/counterfeit medical products’ (or SSFFCMP) in its 
deliberations on these matters. Australia and other supporters of IMPACT 
continue to conflate ‘counterfeit’ with substandard medicines. During the 
debate in the Executive Board in January 2013, Jane Halton (speaking 
for Australia) argued that ‘the consequences for individuals who 
purchased counterfeit or substandard medicines, sometimes at great cost, 
should not be underestimated; such behaviour was, moreover, potentially 
very dangerous for the global health community, particularly in terms of 
increasing antimicrobial resistance’ (WHO 2013:205).   
There are two major issues at stake here: first, the industry project of 
tightening IP protection and enforcement; and second, the regulation of 
medicines supply to guarantee affordability, quality, safety and efficacy 
(QSE) and rational use. There is general agreement that national and 
regional medicines regulatory agencies (MRAs) should have 
responsibility for regulating for QSandE and that WHO, in association 
with the International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities, has 
responsibility to support the development of MRAs. However, the 
pharmaceutical industry has reason to be cautious about WHO’s rational 
use of medicines objective and its ethical marketing practices policy.  
The attraction of IMPACT, from the point of view of the industry, was 
that it looked towards harnessing MRAs to progress the IP agenda 
without any focus on marketing practices or the challenge of over-
prescribing.   
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In conclusion, Australia has taken a strong IP stance with respect to 
medicines policy at the WHO. It has contributed to a weakening of the 
capacity/authority of the WHO to advise on the health implications of 
trade agreements, opposed/restricted the WHO from progressing on a 
substantive biomedical R&D treaty, and supported mechanisms that 
conflate quality of medicines issues with IP privileges. These positions 
reflect an imbalance in favour of IP over effective medicines policy. In 
these three cases, Australia’s position has been aligned with that of the 
United States, which suggests that Australia’s position has been shaped at 
least in part by this geopolitical alliance. Notably, there is little awareness 
of Australia’s position at the WHO in the wider Australian community, 
including those involved in development assistance.  
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) 
In addition to its pro IP stance within the WHO, Australia was supportive 
of the United States and its allies in proposing the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) as a means of strengthening the global system 
for the policing and enforcement of IP rights, focusing in particular (but 
not restricted to) on trademarks and copyright.  
The US and Japan commenced work on ACTA in 2006. Negotiations 
involving the US, Australia, Canada, the EU and its 27 member states, 
Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
Switzerland were launched in October 2007; and a final text was released 
in May 2011 (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 2012). The section 
in the proposed Agreement on civil enforcement required parties to make 
provision for injunctions to be issued and damages awarded in relation to 
infringements. Parties to the Agreement would have to legislate for 
courts to be able to order alleged infringers to provide information to the 
rights holder or to the court about the production and distribution of the 
allegedly infringing product. The section on border measures authorised 
seizures by customs officials including the seizure of goods in transit. 
Such seizures may be instituted at the request of the claimant rights 
holder. The section on enforcement provided for criminal procedures and 
penalties for counterfeit trademarks and copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale.  
The proposed Agreement triggered opposition by internet users and 
widespread concerns about the implications for generic medicines. An 
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online petition following the release of the final treaty text in April 2011 
collected 2.8 million signatures (Baraliuc et al. 2013). The secrecy of the 
process was a central theme in the global opposition to ACTA. The 
public had no access to a full draft of the Agreement until 2010, while 
US-based multinational corporations were consulted on the content of the 
draft treaty through an advisory committee. The Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), representing the US 
pharmaceutical industry, was among those providing input to the draft 
text (Love 2009). In Australia, the Joint Committee on Treaties described 
the ‘level of secrecy’ maintained by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) as the ‘most troubling aspect throughout the 
development of ACTA’ (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 2012).  
ACTA was ostensibly concerned with copyright and counterfeiting, that 
is, protection for content producers such as musicians and filmmakers. 
But ‘intellectual property’ was not defined clearly and was widely 
understood to cover patents more broadly, including pharmaceutical 
patents. Of particular concern to public health advocates was that ACTA 
seemed to leave open the possibility of conflating generic drugs with 
‘counterfeit’ products, as per the precedent of IMPACT (India 2011). 
Médecins Sans Frontières issued a report titled A blank cheque for abuse: 
ACTA and its impact on access to medicines (Médecins Sans Frontières 
2012). Reinforcing such concerns was the repeated seizure in 2008-09 of 
shipments of generic drugs in transit through Europe, as mentioned 
above (Arkinstall et al. 2011).  
In Australia, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) was 
critical of ACTA in its report of November 2011, recommending that the 
agreement ‘not be ratified’ pending clarification on key points (Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties 2012). JSCOT was critical of secrecy, 
the lack of evidence of benefit to Australia, vague terminology, lack of 
balance (sole focus on the interests of rights holders) and lack of any 
attention to the wider development issues of technology transfer and 
access to knowledge. The JSCOT referred to the ‘club approach’ that had 
been taken to the negotiation of ACTA under which a group of IP 
exporters agree upon enforcement principles and then expected other 
countries, including developing countries that are IP importers, to accede 
to the agreement.  
India criticised the neglect of the development dimension in ACTA in a 
discussion at the TRIPS Council of the WTO (India 2011). India was 
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concerned that ACTA would be used to target generic medicines, and was 
particularly apprehensive about the provisions for seizures in transit by 
customs authorities. India demonstrated how provisions of the 
Agreement could be used to attack the trade in generic pharmaceuticals, 
and compared the absence of a development dimension in ACTA with the 
provisions in TRIPS dealing with the transfer of technology, socio-
economic development, promotion of innovation and access to 
knowledge. 
In contrast, the Australian government provided wholehearted support. 
According to the then Trade Minister, Craig Emerson, ‘Australia played a 
leading role in the negotiation process’ (Emerson 2011). On the occasion 
of its launch, Dr Emerson announced: ‘This Treaty will help stem the 
burgeoning global trade in counterfeit and pirate materials, worth many 
billions annually’ (Emerson 2011). That Australia’s position was one of 
strong support is evident from interaction between DFAT and the 
parliamentary committee, the government’s response to the committee 
report, and media releases by the Trade Minister (Australian Government 
2012a). Indeed, it has been observed that ‘(DFAT) emerged as ACTA’s 
cheerleader-in-chief in Australia, trumpeting the benefits of the treaty…’ 
(External Contributor 2012).  
ACTA was envisaged as a new mechanism, separate from existing 
international organisations already dealing with IP such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), to strengthen the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. ACTA was to be administered by a new governing body 
for the purpose of providing IP holders with ‘unprecedented protection’ 
(Flint and Payne 2013). Thus ACTA was one of a range of ‘forum 
shifting’ initiatives, to ratchet up IP protection, by the United States and 
allies, including a raft of bilateral and regional ‘TRIPS-Plus’ trade 
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Sell 2011).  
ACTA was signed by Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea and the US in October 2011. In 2012, Mexico, 
the EU and 22 EU members also signed but only one country – Japan – 
has ratified the agreement, which will come into force after ratification 
by six countries. In reality, however, ACTA appears to have failed with 
its rejection by the European parliament in July 2012, following a global 
and particularly European civil society mobilisation (Anonymous 2012). 
Shortly before the vote in the European Parliament Germany’s Justice 
116    JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 73 
Minister criticised ACTA as ‘very inexact, very porous and with a very 
incorrect formulation’ (Anonymous 2012). In contrast, Australia, a core 
member of the 'exclusive club' headed by the US, appears to have taken 
no other position than support for the US and the objective of stronger 
enforcement of IP protection. The concerns of developing countries 
(excluded from the ACTA process) with regard to the potential 
implications for generics elicited no support from Australia. The 
development of ACTA and the establishment of IMPACT occurred in the 
same period and Australia was actively involved in both. Australia was 
promoting the conflation of ‘counterfeit’ with substandard medical 
products in the WHO while negotiating a treaty which explicitly defined 
counterfeit as a trademark infringement.  
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations 
The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) negotiations, which are 
ongoing at the time of writing, represent a third forum in which Australia 
may take a position in support of extending the period of monopoly 
pricing of medicines (particularly in developing countries) and stronger 
enforcement of IP privileges. 
Australia has a long-standing commitment to trade liberalisation pursued 
through trade negotiations as well as unilateral reforms to reduce trade 
barriers. It was no surprise that when plans were announced to extend the 
P4 (Pacific 4) trade agreement between Brunei, New Zealand, Chile and 
Singapore into a larger regional free trade bloc, Australia was at the table. 
Nor was it a surprise that the US would drive the agenda for the TPPA 
and seek to apply templates from other trade agreements as starting point 
for negotiations, including the bilateral agreement with South Korea 
(KORUS) (Flynn et al. 2012).  
The TPPA negotiating parties are a curious assortment of nations with 
widely varying export industries, trade policy priorities and levels of 
development. The US agenda has in many areas clashed with the 
positions of other countries and key areas of the text, including the IP 
chapter, have been highly controversial. The US is seeking to pursue the 
interests of its IP exporting industries, including the pharmaceutical 
industry, while most of the other TPPA parties, including Australia, are 
net IP importers. These tensions have been reflected in Australia’s 
AUSTRALIA’S POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS     117 
position through the negotiations, which has not been one of unqualified 
support to the US. 
The former Labor Government’s 2011 Trade Policy Statement identified 
the TPPA as Australia’s highest trade priority (Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). This policy statement, 
which followed on the heels of the Productivity Commission’s (2010) 
Review of Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements, also marked 
out some ‘red lines’ with respect to the government’s policy priorities for 
this and other trade agreements. While the Trade Policy Statement 
(Trading our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity) demonstrated a 
commitment to trade liberalisation, it also contained strong commitments 
regarding ‘non-trade’ objectives including labour standards, 
environmental protection, and public health. Furthermore, it included 
explicit commitments not to accept provisions that would ‘limit its 
capacity to put health warnings or plain packaging requirements on 
tobacco products or its ability to continue the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme’ (DFAT 2011:14). 
In the earlier bilateral negotiations for the Australia–US Free Trade 
Agreement (AUSFTA), which entered into force in 2005, the Howard 
Government agreed to IP provisions that were not in Australia’s interests, 
such as restrictions on compulsory licensing, and some provisions which, 
while not extending IP rights beyond existing levels, did effectively ‘lock 
in’ relatively high levels of IP protection for the future (Lopert and 
Gleeson 2013). Australia also agreed to the inclusion of an annex on 
pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement (Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2005). While Australia appears 
to have successfully fended off US attempts to use this annex to modify 
processes for listing and pricing pharmaceuticals in ways that would 
advantage patent holders, the fact that this annex was included in the 
agreement at all set an unfortunate precedent. The next bilateral trade 
agreement negotiated by the United States (with South Korea) included a 
far more onerous set of provisions applying to Korea’s programs for 
subsidising medicines and medical devices (Lopert and Gleeson 2013). 
In the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations, leaked documents (United 
States Trade Representative 2011b; United States Trade Representative 
2011a) show that the US tabled a set of extreme intellectual property 
provisions in 2011 that extend well beyond those included in previous 
trade agreements, including the AUSFTA (Lopert and Gleeson 2013). 
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These proposals (Lopert and Gleeson 2013; Flynn et al. 2011) would 
extend the market exclusivity period for new drugs in all of the TPPA 
countries through a range of provisions including: 
 expanding patentability to new forms, uses and methods of using a 
known product; 
 providing for patent term extensions to compensate for delays in 
granting patents or marketing approval; 
 implementing a patent linkage mechanism requiring regulatory 
authorities to scan for existing patents, notify patent holders where a 
patent is in place and delay marketing approval until any disputes 
are settled; 
 eliminating the legal safeguard of pre-grant opposition; and 
 extending data exclusivity periods (five years for new 
pharmaceutical products, a further three years for new uses of 
existing products and potentially up to twelve years for biologics). 
Furthermore, the 2011 US proposals would require countries to allow 
patents for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods. In each of these 
areas, the US TPPA proposals extend well beyond the TRIPS Agreement 
and would limit the flexibilities available under TRIPS, re-affirmed in the 
Doha Declaration, for countries to limit IP rights in order to protect the 
health of their populations (Lopert and Gleeson 2013). The 2011 leaked 
US proposal for the IP chapter also included a set of enforcement 
obligations similar to the most controversial provisions originally 
proposed for ACTA (Flynn et al. 2012). 
The US proposals have attracted stringent criticism from international 
health, development and consumer and human rights organisations such 
as Medecins Sans Frontieres (2012), Oxfam (2013), Public Citizen 
(2013a) and Third World Network (2013) for the effects they would be 
likely to have on access to affordable medicines in developing countries. 
The bulk of the 2011 US proposals were opposed by all the other TPPA 
countries (Inside U.S. Trade 2012), and the IP chapter was widely 
reported as one of the key sticking points in the negotiations (Inside U.S. 
Trade 2013b). 
Australian health, development and fair trade NGOs also opposed the US 
IP proposals for the TPPA. This opposition was expressed in various 
submissions, including to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) (Public Health Association of Australia et al. 2013) and many 
letters to politicians (Baum et al. 2013; Moore 2013),  media releases 
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(Public Health Association of Australia 2013) and other advocacy 
documents (Hirono et al. 2014). Organisations involved in this advocacy 
effort included the Public Health Association of Australia, the Australian 
Fair Trade and Investment Network, the Australian Federation of AIDS 
Organisations, the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association, 
Palliative Care Australia, the Australian Medical Students’ Association, 
the Australian Health Promotion Association and many others. As well as 
written submissions and letters, many of these organisations also had 
frequent discussions with trade negotiators and in some cases attended 
stakeholder events at TPPA negotiating rounds. The advocacy undertaken 
by these organisations focused on the risks the US IP proposals presented 
for the affordability of medicines both for Australians and for those in 
developing countries. 
Documents released by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
under Freedom of Information (FOI), although heavily redacted, confirm 
that trade officials were cognisant that existing IP standards in Australia 
are inappropriately high for some of the other TPPA parties, and suggest 
that some of these advocacy messages had been taken up to a certain 
degree in the Australian negotiating position. Briefing material prepared 
by DFAT for a meeting with PhRMA and Biotechnology Industry 
Association (BIO) included the following points (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade 2012a): 
Possible “development” impact of the US proposals 
 The Australian government, and our stakeholders, are also 
concerned that the US proposals may increase the cost of 
medicines, and delay the introduction of generic 
medicines, for developing countries in the region 
- this could make it harder for the poorest in 
developing countries to access necessary treatment 
- and limit the current reach of Australia’s aid 
expenditure on medicines and vaccines. 
Yet, the former Labor Government’s position was essentially defensive, 
seeking to maintain the domestic status quo (which has often been 
referred to as a ‘balance’ between the interests of IP rights holders and 
the community). For example, briefing material for stakeholder meetings 
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conducted by DFAT on the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement and 
Intellectual Property (2012b), released under FOI, includes the statement: 
The Government is aiming to develop a high-quality IP chapter 
that deals with recent developments in international IP, but does 
not go beyond Australia’s existing domestic regime or require 
legislative change 
- we are seeking provisions that allow us to maintain the 
flexibilities in our IP system, and that strike an 
appropriate balance between the interests of right 
holders, users and the community. 
In November 2013, Wikileaks published a leaked consolidated draft of 
the IP chapter of the TPPA, dated 30 August 2013, documenting the 
negotiating positions of all twelve TPPA parties at the end of the most 
recent official round of the negotiations (Trans Pacific Partnership 2013). 
The draft chapter showed that the US was continuing to push for the 
same extreme IP provisions, with a couple of exceptions (e.g. the clause 
eliminating pre-grant opposition that had appeared in earlier drafts was 
missing from the 2013 draft) (Public Citizen 2013b). The draft chapter 
also includes a set of border enforcement provisions of sufficiently broad 
scope to enable the seizure of legitimate generic pharmaceuticals 
(Weatherall 2013:32). 
It is clear from this draft text that the Australian Government of the day 
opposed many of the worst US proposals for pharmaceutical patents. For 
example, the text indicates that before the 2013 election, Australia 
rejected proposals to extend patent periods to compensate for delays in 
regulatory approval and to extend data exclusivity periods (Trans Pacific 
Partnership 2013).  
It is not so clear, however, whether the Labor Government was 
supporting the efforts of other countries to strike a better balance 
between intellectual property privileges and the public interest. The 
leaked draft showed that five countries (New Zealand, Canada, Chile, 
Singapore and Malaysia) had made a counter-proposal which presented a 
more flexible approach that would largely protect access to affordable 
medicines in the region (Cox 2013). This text does not indicate 
Australia’s position on most provisions in this counter-proposal. 
Inside US Trade (2013a) reported that Australia was involved in the early 
development of this proposal, and it is likely that Australia’s silence on 
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key elements in the draft was due to the caretaker period before the 
election (Cox 2013). But Australia appears to have supported a US 
proposal to require countries to allow patents for new uses and new 
methods of using existing drugs (Trans Pacific Partnership 2013). This 
calls into question the previous Government’s commitment to preserving 
access to medicines in the region. The US proposal for new uses and 
methods is consistent with current Australian law and the provisions of 
the AUSFTA, but would encourage evergreening of patents (extending 
the monopoly term by gaining additional patents for minor, 
therapeutically insignificant variations to existing products) in other 
TPPA countries, including Vietnam, which already has significant 
problems providing access to medicines for much of its population. 
The trade policy of the Liberal-National Coalition Government elected in 
September 2013 (Coalition Government 2013) raised concerns in the 
Australian public health community. It expressed a strong commitment to 
concluding trade deals, increasing foreign investment and reducing risk 
for investors, and indicated that the new government was open to 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms in trade agreements. There 
was an emphasis on greater consultation with industry, and no mention of 
civil society stakeholders or of health, medicines or the environment. The 
Minister for Trade and Investment, however, issued a statement soon 
after the release of the November 2013 leak that reiterated the previous 
government’s commitment to avoiding provisions that would undermine 
the PBS or the health system (Janda 2013), and these types of statements 
have been repeatedly made by the new government.  
The TPPA negotiations have been shrouded in secrecy, illuminated by 
occasional leaks, and we can only speculate on what level of IP 
protection Australia will be prepared to settle for. At the time of writing, 
there is little public evidence of Australia’s current position. Media 
reports during TPPA ministerial meetings in December 2013 (Expose the 
TPPA 2013) suggest that Australia, among other countries, may have 
given in to some of the US demands for IP and medicines but these 
reports have not been verified.  
Past experience (including at WHO and ACTA) suggest that Australia 
may end up supporting the US position or seeking some middle ground, 
rather than supporting the position of the developing countries. This is 
particularly likely if such support is perceived to compromise Australia’s 
interests in other areas (e.g. agricultural market access) in the final stages 
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of the negotiations. However, a key difference in Australia’s approach in 
the TPPA, compared to the internal debates within the WHO and its 
position on ACTA, is that it has encountered intense domestic criticism 
and advocacy. 
Conclusions  
This article has explored Australia’s role in three areas of global 
medicines policy relating to IP protection: within the WHO (access, 
innovation and regulation) and in the negotiations for ACTA and the 
TPPA.  
In the World Health Assembly Australia has: first, failed to support a role 
for WHO in encouraging developing countries to adopt legislation which 
takes full advantage of flexibilities available under the TRIPS 
Agreement; second, failed to support the delinking of monopoly pricing 
from R&D for diseases which disproportionately affect developing 
countries; and third, has supported the International Medical Products 
Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) which has promoted the 
criminalisation of IP infringements and has sought to require medicines 
regulatory authorities to take on a policing role with respect to IP and 
medicines.  
In the negotiations around ACTA, Australia supported attempts to 
establish a reinforced IP enforcement regime, in the expectation that 
developing countries, urgently needing technology transfer and access to 
knowledge, would eventually be forced to join. In this context, Australia 
sanctioned the possibility that ACTA would open the way for the in-
transit seizure of generic medical products deemed to be ‘counterfeit’. In 
its support for IMPACT and ACTA and in contributions to WHO debates 
Australia has consistently supported the agenda for stronger IP protection 
and supported the US in its opposition to WHO playing a role in 
promoting trade and health policy coherence.  
In its participation in the ‘exclusive club’ that developed ACTA, Australia 
placed no value on the role of technology transfer and access to 
knowledge in social and economic development. In both ACTA and the 
TPPA Australia appears to have expressed little concern regarding 
monopoly pricing as a barrier to access in developing countries.  
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Australia’s ultimate stance in the TPPA negotiations is yet to be 
determined. The provisions proposed for the TPPA in relation to IP 
protection and its policing are far more extreme than those accepted by 
Australia in the AUSFTA in 2005. It is unlikely that Australia will agree 
to extremely high standards of IP protection that would be 
disadvantageous domestically. It is more likely that Australia will 
acquiesce to provisions that will result in higher levels of IP protection in 
some of the less developed countries that form part of the TPPA process.  
The Australian government’s apparent willingness to defend the PBS in 
the TPPA negotiations may reflect its fiscal exposure (as funder of the 
PBS) or voter concern or both. Certainly the leaked texts, the rising 
public awareness of the risks of the TPPA and the advocacy of civil 
society organisations appear to have contributed to some caution with 
respect to domestic sensitivities. It seems that the development 
implications of the TPPA proposals are being given less weight. 
Australia’s initial support for ACTA during its highly secretive 
negotiation appears to have shown no concern for either public health or 
development implications. However, its rejection by JSCOT show that 
parliamentary scrutiny was able to give some weight to such 
considerations, albeit at the eleventh hour.  
In both the TPPA and ACTA cases it is striking that while public and 
parliament were kept in the dark during the negotiations, the corporations 
that stood to gain from stronger IP protection had privileged access to 
draft text during the negotiations. The privileging of the transnational 
corporations over democratic accountability is concerning.  
The positions adopted by Australia in WHO debates over TRIPS 
flexibilities, trade and health policy coherence, delinking R&D from 
monopoly pricing and the IMPACT agenda were broadly consistent with 
the corporate interest, with the US position and with neoliberal ideology. 
Australia’s position at WHO has been less secretive but unaccountable 
regarding its development implications. In the TPPA negotiations, the 
implications for the PBS are clearly being given some weight although it 
seems that Australia has not taken a strong position on the development 
issues. The added dimension of market access bargaining in the TPPA 
negotiations adds a further complexity; Australia’s ultimate position on 
IP and medicines may be shaped as much by trade-offs to gain better 
terms for its exports than by particular commitments regarding 
intellectual property. 
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The secrecy of international negotiations and lack of public 
accountability for the position taken by Australia in these negotiations 
appears to have contributed to the neglect of public health and 
development solidarity.  
In important respects the pharmaceutical industry stands opposed to 
development objectives such as technology transfer and access to 
knowledge. Maximising profits and shareholder value depends on high 
levels of IP protection and strong enforcement, but loose regulation of 
pricing, marketing and utilisation. Standing with the transnational 
pharmaceutical industry is an array of corporations in other knowledge 
intensive industries (including entertainment, electronics and computing) 
looking to benefit from high IP protection and strong enforcement.  
There is a need for closer monitoring of Australia’s official position in 
these and similar negotiations and stronger demand for policies informed 
by public health objectives and development solidarity. This might 
involve better informed, better organised public health advocacy, closer 
links between public health advocates and other civil society movements 
committed to knowledge access, and closer liaison with social 
movements and governments in the global South.  
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